



NORTH KOREA

This e-spotlite documents the foreign policy of the United States with regard to North Korea. It provides access to all major USG statements since January 2003, as well as to a variety of background documents: reports, hearings and journal articles.

The most recent U.S. Government Statements - Washington File

- Bush Urges Diplomatic Solution to North Korean Missile Situation – 7 July 2006
- United States Condemns North Korea's Missile Launches - 5 July 2006
- World Can Deal with North Korea's "Brinkmanship," Rice Says - 5 July 2006
- U.N. Security Council Considering Action on North Korea - 5 July 2006
- U.S. Should Consider Direct Talks with North Korea, Lawmaker Says – 29 June, 2006
- U.S. Cautions North Korea Against Missile Launch – 29 June, 2006
- North Korean Missile Launch Would Be "Unacceptable," Bush Says - 29 June, 2006
- Bush, Japan's Koizumi to Discuss North Korea, Iran – 29 June, 2006
- North Korea Must Disclose Missile Test Intentions, Bush Says – 26 June, 2006
- U.S., Allies Urge North Korea Against Missile Tests – 22 June, 2006
- North Korean Threat Renews Interest in U.S. Missile Defense – 21 June, 2006
- U.S. Says North Korean Missile Test Would Violate Moratorium – 19 June, 2006
- Burma, North Korea, Laos Fail To Stop Human Trafficking, U.S. Says – 6 June, 2006
- White House Report, June 1: Immigration Reform, North Korea, Congo – 1 June, 2006
- Iran, North Korea Pose a Challenge to Effective Multilateralism – 18 May, 2006
- Security Considerations Part of Refugee Admissions Process – 11 May, 2006
- Commission Cites Five Asian Nations for Lack of Religious Freedom – 4 May, 2006
- U.S. Reaffirms Strong Ties with Republic of Korea – 3 May, 2006
- North Korea Must Respect Human Rights To Gain Respect, Bush Says – 29 April, 2006
- House Panels Hold Historic Hearing on North Korean Abductions – 27 April, 2006
- U.S. Envoy Calls for More Radio News Broadcasts into North Korea – 27 April, 2006
- Narcotics, Counterfeiting Help Fund North Korea, U.S. Says – 26 April, 2006
- U.S. Supports China's Pledge for Economic Reforms, Officials Say – 21 April, 2006
- U.S. Intensifies Efforts To Promote Human Rights in North Korea – 5 April, 2006
- U.S.-South Korea Trade Pact Could Benefit Women Entrepreneurs 31 March, 2006
- U.S.-South Korea Alliance Adapting to Societal Changes – 31 March, 2006
- Iran, North Korea Threaten To Develop, Spread Nuclear Weapons – 1 March, 2006
- North Korea Tops Media Censorship List – 2 February, 2006
- Kim Jong Il's Visit to China a "Milepost," State's Zoellick Says - 26 January, 2006
- North Korea Must Live Up to Its U.N. Commitments on Human Rights 12 December, 2005

- Time for "Real Action" on North Korea's Pledge, U.S. Envoy Says – 6 October, 2005
- State's Schulte Says North Korea Now Must Implement Commitments - 23 September, 2005
- North Korea Agrees To Abandon Its Nuclear Weapons Programs 19 September, 2005
- North Korea's "Human Traumas" Must Be Addressed, Congressman Says – 20 July, 2005
- Nuclear-Free North Korea Can Receive Aid, State's Hill Says- 14 June, 2005
- U.S. House Member Urges Firm, Compassionate North Korean Policy 17 May, 2005
- International Coordination Key to Helping North Korean Refugees – 2 May, 2005
- "Openness" and "Choice" Keys to Future of Asia, Rice Says – 19 March, 2005

The Six Party Talks


Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China – In July 2005, North Korea rejoined the Six-Party Talks after a 13-month hiatus and agreed in September to abandon its nuclear weapons program and return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while resuming construction of its two larger reactors. North Korea may continue to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons as long as Six-Party Talks do not bring a resolution.

The fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, held in Beijing, China, began on July 26, 2005 and went into recess on August 7, 2005; the talks resumed on September 13, 2005 and concluded on September 19, 2005, at which time a joint statement was agreed upon and released. The first session of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks began in Beijing on November 9, 2005 and concluded on November 11, 2005. The six-nation negotiations include North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

USG Reports

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. Larry A. Niksch. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated April 7, 2006.


North Korea's decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign policy problem for the United States. Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent to stage a "nuclear breakout" of its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons. North Korea's actions follow the reported disclosure in October 2002 that North Korea is operating a secret nuclear program based on uranium enrichment and the decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials in 2004 stated that North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the fuel rods and may have produced 4-6 atomic bombs from them.

 **U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet.** Mark E. Manyin. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated January 31, 2006.

Since 1995, the United States has provided over \$1.1 billion, about 60% of which has paid for food aid. About 40% was energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral organization established in 1994 to provide energy aid in exchange for North Korea's pledge to halt its existing nuclear program. U.S. assistance to North Korea has fallen significantly over the past three years. The KEDO program was shut down in January 2006. Food aid has been scrutinized because the DPRK government restricts the ability of donor agencies to operate in the country. Compounding the problem is that South Korea and China, by far North Korea's two most important providers of food aid, have little to no monitoring systems in place.

 **North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?** Sharon A. Squassoni. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated January 24, 2006.

North Korea ended the eight-year freeze on its nuclear program in late 2002, expelling international inspectors and restarting plutonium production facilities. Before 2002, the CIA estimated that North Korea might have enough plutonium (Pu) for 1 or 2 weapons. Since then, North Korea may have reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously under seal at Yongbyon, yielding enough Pu for 6 or 8 weapons. In 2005, North Korea announced it had nuclear weapons and was building more. North Korea reportedly shut down the small reactor in April to extract plutonium. If so, it could have two more weapons by April 2006.

 **North Korea: Economic Sanctions.** Dianne E. Rennack. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated June 16, 2005.

U.S. economic sanctions are imposed against North Korea for four primary reasons: (1) North Korea is seen as posing a threat to U.S. national security; (2) North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; and (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In accordance with U.S. law, the United States limits some trade, denies trade in dual-use goods and services, limits foreign aid, and opposes entry into or support from international financial institutions. At the President's discretion, North Korea would also be subject to the economic sanctions pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, under which the administration has identified North Korea as a "country of particular concern" since 2001, and pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, under which the administration has classified North Korea in the category of most severe offender (Tier 3) since 2003.

 **The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and U.S. Government Policy Towards Them.** Department of State. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. March 11, 2005

The international community faces a dearth of verifiable information on the humanitarian status of North Koreans either inside or outside North Korea, as well as information on the circumstances refugees face if they are forcibly returned to North Korea. Despite repeated approaches by the United States and others, China refuses to abide by its obligations as a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol to grant UNHCR access to North Koreans who seek asylum in China and to permit screenings of persons asserting a need for protection. The PRC insists that North Koreans in China are "economic migrants" who have no legitimate claim to refugee status. In 2004, several thousand North Koreans were reportedly detained and forcibly returned to North Korea, where many faced persecution and some may have been executed. At the same time, the discreet movement of North Korean nationals to the Republic of Korea (ROK) continues. Over 4,000 North Koreans resettled in the ROK between 2002 and 2004.

 **North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004.** Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery and Helene Marchart. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 24, 2005.

This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea from October 2002 through December 31, 2004. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis provides background on U.S. policy preceding October 2002 as well as an overview of developments and dynamics among the major players in the North Korea nuclear dispute: South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. Particular attention is paid to

the demise of the Agreed Framework, the ongoing six party talks, China's prominent role in the negotiations, inter-Korean relations, and the Japanese abductee issue. Also discussed is Congress' role in dealing with North Korea, including the passage of the North Korea Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333).

 **Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy.** Raphael F. Perl. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. December 5, 2003.

At least 50 documented incidents in more than 20 countries around the world, many involving arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats, link North Korea to drug trafficking. Such events, in the context of credible, but unproven, allegations of large scale state sponsorship of drug production and trafficking, raise important issues for the United States and its allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers is how to pursue an effective counter drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while pursuing other high-priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including: (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting, and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. Reports that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing given the country's chronic food shortages, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the degree to which profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profit enterprises may be used to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. As the DPRK's drug trade becomes increasingly entrenched, and arguably decentralized, analysts question whether the Pyongyang regime (or any subsequent government) would have the ability to restrain such activity, should it so desire.

Congressional Research Service

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status and Issues. CRS, 2 June, 2006

Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations. CRS, 31 May, 2006

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. CRS, 25 May, 2006

Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues. CRS, 3 May, 2006

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. CRS, 27 April, 2006

Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments. CRS, 12 April, 2006. 6p.

The Nuclear Dilemma and Lessons from Chernobyl. Fed. of American Scientists (FAS)] April 2006. 17p.

US Government Fact Sheets

State Department Says U.S. to Donate More Food to North Korea – 25 February, 2003

Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation. "First, the President's policy is to achieve the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful multilateral diplomacy, through the Six-Party Talks," says Christopher Hill, the State Department's assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs – 14 June, 2005

- North Korea Agrees To Abandon Its Nuclear Weapons Programs – 19 September, 2005.
- U.S. Prepared to Resolve Issues with Korea, Revere Says – 11 March, 2005.
- North Korea "Foremost" in Spreading Missile Technology, Bolton Says – 28 October, 2004

Human Rights. "We will continue to work toward the day when the long-suffering people of North Korea will enjoy the basic rights and freedoms that are the true foundation of prosperity and strength in the world community, and we expect that the forthcoming appointment of a Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea will greatly enhance our efforts." North Korea's "Human Traumas" Must Be Addressed, Congressman Says – 20 July, 2005

Congressional Hearings

Lifting the Veil: Getting the Refugees Out, Getting Our Message In: An Update on the Implementation of the North Korean Human Rights Act. Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations. October 27, 2005.

- **Hearing Notice**
- **The Honorable Christopher H. Smith**, Chairman
- **The Honorable James A. Leach**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
- **Ms. Kelu Chao and Mr. Daniel Southerland**, Associate Director for Language Programming, Voice of America Broadcasting Board of Governors [combined statement]
- **Mrs. Ma Soon Hee**, North Korean Defector, Victim & Witness to Trafficking of North Korean Females including her own daughters in China
- **Mrs. Cha Kyeong Sook**, Defector from North Korea, Victim & Witness to Trafficking of North Korean Females including her own daughters in China
- **Mr. Tim Peters**, Founder/Helping Hands Korea

 **North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: Strategies and Prospects for Success.** Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. July 14, 2005.

- **Hearing Notice**
- **The Honorable James A. Leach**, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
- **The Honorable Donald P. Gregg**, Chairman of The Korea Society
- **Mr. Scott Snyder**, Senior Associate The Asia Foundation/Pacific Forum CSIS
- **Mr. William M. Drennan**, Consultant
- **Mr. David Albright**, President, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)

 **North Korea: An Update on Six-Party Talks and Matters Related to the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.** Source: United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, June 14, 2005.


- **Senator Lugar's Opening Statement**
- **The Honorable Christopher R. Hill**, Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC

 **The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004: Issues and Implementation.** Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. April 28, 2005.

- **Hearing Notice**
- **The Honorable James A. Leach**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
- **The Honorable Christopher H. Smith**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations
- **The Honorable Joseph E. DeTrani**, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks; **The Honorable Arthur E. "Gene" Dewey**, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration and **Ms. Gretchen A. Birkle**, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (combined statement)
- **Ann J. Buwalda**, Esq., Director Jubilee Campaign USA
- **Marcus Noland**, Ph.D., Senior Fellow Institute for International Economics
- **Hearing Transcript**

 **The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Is There a Way Forward?** Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, February 17, 2005.

- **Representative James A. Leach**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
- **The Honorable Edward R. Royce**
- **Ralph A. Cossa**, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [**appendix material**]
- **Nicholas Eberstadt**, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute [**appendix material**]
- **Jon Brook Wolfsthal**, Deputy Director for Nonproliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- **Robert Sutter**, Ph.D.

 **North Korea: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges.** Source: U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. April 28, 2004.

- **Statement of Rep. James A. Leach Chairman**, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
- **Statement of Chairman Elton Gallegly**
- **Testimony of L. Gordon Flake Executive Director**, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
- **Tarik M. Radwan**, Assistant Professor of Law, Handong International Law School, Pohang, Korea, and Advocate with Jubilee Campaign, USA
- **Tim A. Peters**, Founder/Director Helping Hands Korea
- **Testimony of Suzanne K. Scholte**, President, Defense Forum Foundation

 **The North Korean Nuclear Calculus: Beyond the Six Power Talks.** Source: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. March 2, 2004.

- **Mr. Victor Cha**, Associate Professor of Government, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
- **Mr. Tom Malinowski**, Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC

 **An Update on North Korean Nuclear Developments.** Committee on Foreign Relations.

Wednesday, January 21, 2004.

- **Senator Lugar's Opening Statement / Senator Biden's Opening Statement**
- **Dr. Siegfried Hecker**, Senior Fellow Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, NM.

 **Corruption in North Korea's Economy.** Source: U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 2003.

 **Drugs, Counterfeiting, and Weapons Proliferation: The North Korea Connection.** Source: U.S. Senate, Governmental Affairs, May 20, 2003.

- **Witness list / Video**

 **To Receive testimony from unified and regional commanders on their military strategy and operational requirements in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2004 and the Future Years Defense Program.** Source: U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, March 13, 2003.

 **"North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Challenge to Stability in Northeast Asia".** Source: U.S. House International Relations, Feb. 13, 2003.

- **Hearing Notice, Honorable James. A. Leach / Honorable James A. Kelly**

 **WMD Developments on the Korean Peninsula.** Source: U.S. Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 4, 2003.

- Hearing opening statement on North Korea by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman **Dick Lugar**
- The Honorable **Richard L. Armitage** Deputy Secretary Department of State Washington D.C.. | The Honorable James A. Kelly Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Department of State Washington D.C.

The Honorable **Ashton B. Carter** Co-director, Preventive Defense Project Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Professor of Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Cambridge, MA | The Honorable Stephen W. Bosworth Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Executive Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Medford, MA | Mr. **Donald P. Gregg**, President and Chairman of the Korea Society Former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Former Security Advisor to Vice President George Bush New York, New York.

Journal Articles

NORTH KOREAN TALKS HIT IMPASSE by Paul Kerr in *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb 2006. 3p.

[Full text available here](#)

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill has expressed mounting frustration with the limited success of six-party talks aimed at resolving concerns over North Korea's uranium-enrichment program. In lieu of negotiations, Hill during the November meeting offered to arrange a working-level briefing about relevant U.S. regulations for North Korean officials.

NORTH KOREA, U.S. TALKS INCH FORWARD by Paul Kerr in *Arms Control Today*, April. 2p.

[Full text available here](#)

North Korea and the United States appear to have made incremental progress toward convening another meeting.

NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISES: AN END IN SIGHT? by Jun Bong-Geun in *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb. 4p.

[Full text available here](#)

Despite the emotional appeal in the United States of terminating the evil North Korean regime, the collapse approach was neither welcomed nor supported in the Northeast Asian region, as it tended to feed confrontation and crisis and led to North Korea's withdrawal and isolation from the international community. Moreover, permanent denuclearization will require progress and close coordination in five separate areas: dismantlement, security assurance and diplomatic normalization, economic aid, peace-regime building on the Korean peninsula, and Northeast Asia security cooperation. In a final stage, North Korea would complete dismantlement and resolve any outstanding issues about its nuclear program, its long range missile efforts, or accusations that it has an arsenal of biological and chemical weapons.

INSIDE MULTILATERALISM: THE SIX-PARTY TALKS by John S. Park in *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2005, 17p.

[Full text available here](#)

Despite extensive diplomatic efforts to facilitate the six-party talks, domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries have brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral negotiating table. *John S. Park is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University. He is currently project leader of the North Korea Analysis Group, a Managing the Atom Project working group at BCSIA.*

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: PERCEIVED INTERESTS, APPROACHES AND PROSPECTS by Richard P. Cronin in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter 2005. 24p.

[Full text available here](#)

Richard Cronin evaluates North Korea's burgeoning nuclear defense program as a cause of increased diplomatic and military cooperation between Japan and the United States. *Richard P. Cronin is a Specialist in Asian Affairs with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, a non-partisan research and information arm of the U.S. Congress.*

DID NORTH KOREA CHEAT? by Selig Harrison in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005. 18p.

[Full text available here](#)

Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data-while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses. *Selig S. Harrison is Director of the Asia Program and Chairman of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy at the Center for International Policy. He is also a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of Korean Endgame.*

THE FORGOTTEN LESSONS OF HELSINKI HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS by John Feffer in *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2004. 10p.

Full text available from the American Reference Center (pl. see back page)

Human rights became an instrument of US foreign policy in the 1970s in the context of detente with the Soviet Union. In Washington, a group of Democrats who were liberal on social policy and hawkish on foreign policy coalesced around Rep Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Likewise, human rights were not at the top of the agenda when the Helsinki Accords were assigned in 1975. Feffer discusses on the forgotten lessons of Helsinki on human rights and the US-North Korean relations. *John Feffer is a Pantech Fellow at the Korea Studies Program at Stanford University and the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven Stories Press, 2003) and Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions (South End Press, 1992).*

THE PERSISTENCE OF NORTH KOREA by Nicholas Eberstadt in *Public Policy Review*, October/November 2004. 25p.

Full text available here


Can the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (dprk, aka North Korea) survive — as a distinct regime, an autonomous state, a specific political-economic system, and a sovereign country? Can it continue to function in the manner in which it has been performing since the end of 1991 — that is to say, since the final collapse of the Soviet empire? Or is it doomed to join the Warsaw Pact's failed communist experiments in the dustbin of history? Or might it, instead, adapt and evolve — "surviving" in the sense of maintaining its political authority and power to rule but transforming its defining functional characteristics and systemic identity? *Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute.*

REALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA: THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Jihan Hwang in *World Affairs*, Summer 2004. 16p.

Full text available from the American Reference Center (pl. see back page)

Many people believe that there is a fundamental difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations in terms of the perceptions of the North Korea regime. This perception gap, in turn, explains the divergent foreign policies of the two administrations. Indeed, the Bush administration appears to consider North Korea as a reckless and aggressive expansionist state with which the US will be unable to negotiate and achieve a satisfactory result. *Jihwan Hwang is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder.*

Non US Government Reports

 **Kim Jong II and North Korea: the Leader and the System.** Andrew Scobell. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). March 2006.


The author, associate research professor at the U.S. Army War College, explores North Korea's political dynamics and seeks to shed light on Pyongyang's political system and its leader. He contends that the system is best conceived as a totalitarian regime that, although weakened, remains remarkably resilient. After analyzing the key elements of totalitarianism, he argues that the system's greatest test will probably come after the death of Kim Jong II. While the totalitarian

regime may not long survive Kim's passing, one cannot assume that the system will collapse. Rather, the end of totalitarianism may simply mean that the DPRK will enter a new "post-totalitarian" phase similar to the paths taken by other communist systems such as the Soviet Union and China.

 **The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea.** Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program. December 2005.

The authors outline the reasons why multilateral, cooperative threat reduction should play an important role in future efforts to eliminate the threat posed by North Korean weapons programs; why it is possible to work cooperatively with Pyongyang under the right circumstances; the potential contributions of key countries to this effort; and a series of possible threat reduction projects covering nuclear, missile and chemical/biological weapons.

In their estimation, the elimination of these threats will require a series of diplomatic agreements, perhaps stretching out over the next decade, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. The Beijing Six-Party Talks represents the beginning of that effort, dealing with the immediate threat posed by Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. The authors conclude that integrating cooperative threat reduction programs into those talks and any subsequent agreements would serve the interests of the United States and other participants in those negotiations, as well as those of North Korea.


 **North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Korean Unification.** Charles Wolf, Jr. and Kamil Akramov. RAND. Web-posted May 25, 2005.

This RAND report analyzes some of the economic, political, and security issues associated with possible Korean unification. The analysis considers the numerous puzzles and paradoxes that obscure the North Korean system, especially that system's structure and functioning as a "rent-seeking" economy. The authors also consider how the system might unravel, leading to the possibility of reunification, and what the attendant capital costs of reunification would be under differing circumstances and assumptions. They compare their own estimates of these costs with those produced by other institutions and analysts. The report provides comparisons and contrasts between the German experience with unification in the 1990s and that which might impend in Korea. The report concludes by briefly assessing the problems that a reunified Korea would confront relating to possession of weapons of mass destruction, its relations with neighboring countries, especially China, and its alliance ! with the United States.

 **Dismantling North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programs.** David J. Bishop. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). April 2005.

This report examines the choices available to the United States for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The options range from doing nothing to executing policies of engagement, containment, or preemption. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and there are numerous factors influencing the problem. The major factors include U.S. national interests, the role of China, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, the difficult nature of North Korea, and the U.S. war on terror. The author argues that "The optimal course of action is not one policy in particular, but a combination of engagement and containment. Furthermore, preemptive action will invite foreign policy disaster for the United States and should only be used as a last resort. Specific policy recommendations to improve implementation of a hybrid policy of engagement and containment include strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, supplementing multilateral talks with bilateral talks, offering a formal security guarantee to North Korea, broadening the Proliferation Security Initiative to include China, and improving national intelligence

capabilities. If preemption must be used, says Bishop, national leaders must know what conditions would trigger that decision, and they must prepare in advance the necessary protocol for warning and informing friends, allies, and other concerned parties.

 **Korean Reunification: Implications for the United States and Northeast Asia.** Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard. Brookings Institution. January 14, 2005.

The author argues that the reunification itself of the Korean peninsula is less important than when and how the reunification takes place. He favors a gradual unification, as this would have a better chance of political success and would entail less financial hardship for the South Korean populace. One potential problem with gradualism, however, is that the U.S. and other countries may find that any attempts at gradual reunification as a strengthening, albeit limited, of the Kim Jong-il regime. Pritchard also contemplates the roles of regional organization, arguing for a new Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD).

 **China and North Korea: From Comrades-In-Arms to Allies at Arm's Length.** Scobell, Andrew. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). March 2004.

Since the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which emerged in October 2002, the United States and other countries have pinned high hopes on Chinese efforts to moderate and reason with North Korea. Beijing's initiative to bring Pyongyang to the table in the so-called Six-Party Talks and host them seems to substantiate these hopes. Yet, as Dr. Andrew Scobell points out in this monograph, it would be unrealistic to raise one's expectations over what China might accomplish vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing plays a useful and important role on the Korean Peninsula, but in the final analysis, Scobell argues that there are significant limitations on China's influence both in terms of what actions Beijing would be prepared to take and what impact this pressure can have. If this analysis is correct, then North Korea is unlikely to mend its ways anytime soon.

 **All the players at the table: A Multilateral Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.** Source: Cato Policy Analysis No. 478. Bandow, Doug. Cato Institute. June 26, 2003.

Multilateral negotiations and pressure from the four regional powers - China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea - offer the best hope of forestalling North Korean production and sale of nuclear weapons. A regional approach will force Washington to consider the wishes of the DPRK's neighbors, none of whom is eager to destabilize the North. The Bush administration should be willing to cooperate with the other regional powers. Given that the North Korean nuclear program poses a far greater threat to the DPRK's neighbors than to the United States, the United States should demand that those countries become involved in developing a multilateral solution. Each country may have different reasons for wanting to resolve the crisis peacefully, and the Bush administration has hoped that those considerations would encourage each party to come to the table. But Washington should do more than hope. Policymakers should structure their diplomatic efforts to highlight the mutual interests at stake in the crisis. The United States, in the process, should begin reducing its profile in the region.

 **Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.** Source: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Abramowitz, Morton I., Laney, James T. and Heginbotham, Eric. May 19, 2003.

Despite some convergence of positions within the allied camp, significant differences remain, limiting the effectiveness of policies adopted by each. Washington favors a policy of isolation while Seoul pursues one of engagement. American friends and allies in the region part ways with the

United States over how to manage the nuclear crisis and ultimately induce change in the North. Regional partners fear that the United States will attack North Korean nuclear facilities and unleash war on the peninsula. All of these states, particularly South Korea and China, tend to oppose anything resembling comprehensive sanctions for fear that an embargo would lead to war as North Korea has threatened. What the regional partners do agree on is that the United States should seriously negotiate with Pyongyang in hopes of reaching a peaceful resolution to the crisis and, at the very least, test North Korean intentions. Though desirous of being included in the talks, on balance, they are far less concerned with being involved in multilateral negotiations than they are in ensuring that real negotiations - multilateral or bilateral - take place and that Washington and Pyongyang directly engage. The United States has not persuaded its regional partners that it is serious about negotiations, making efforts to secure their approval for a significantly tougher position difficult if not impossible. If negotiations fail or should U.S. intelligence confirm that North Korea has reprocessed its spent fuel, it is uncertain whether our partners would be willing to put significantly greater pressure on North Korea.

 **Addressing the North Korea Nuclear Challenge.** Source: Stanford University, Institute for International Studies. April 2003.

North Korea's renewed bid for nuclear weapons poses an urgent, serious foreign policy challenge to the United States. The current situation though it bears a resemblance to the events of 1993-1994 is far more dangerous and difficult. North Korea has developed longer-range ballistic missiles; South Korea's growing nationalism has put its U.S. relations on shakier ground; and the United States is distracted by the wars on terrorism and for regime change in Iraq. (...) In the end, Pyongyang must choose: economic assistance and security assurance on the condition that all nuclear activities be abandoned, or dire consequences if nuclear programs continue. Any new agreement, however, must avoid the deficiencies of the 1994 Agreed Framework. It must be more verifiable, less readily reversible, more comprehensive, more politically defensible, and more enforceable through the involvement of North Korea's neighbors.

 **A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean War.** Source: United States Institute of Peace. April 2003.

Although the Korean War Armistice Agreement stopped the fighting in 1953, it has yet to be replaced by a permanent settlement. A U.S. initiative to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, a four-party conference to craft a political settlement of the Korean conflict, in return for the verified dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, would:

- * Meet the U.S. requirement for a multilateral solution to the nuclear issue;
- * Address the fundamental source of insecurity for both Koreas (the unresolved state of war);
- * Likely be supported by our allies and other regional states.
- * Leave the United States in a stronger position to deal with North Korea if it refuses a political approach to dismantling its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

 **Economic Leverage and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.** Source: Institute for International Economics. Policy Brief 03-3, Kimberly Ann Elliott. April 2003.

The combined effects of isolation, economic mismanagement, high military spending, and the lingering effects of the mid-1990s famine, the North Korean economy barely functions. For several years, it has been incapable even of feeding its people without international assistance. Because North Korea's trade and financial relations with the rest of the world are limited, the scope and volume of potential leverage are also limited, which, in turn, restricts the range of sanctions options available. But the philosophy of "juche", emphasizing self-reliance, also means that North

Korea imports only those products that it needs to keep the economy functioning and cannot produce domestically; it must then either export to earn hard currency to pay for the imports or provide products for barter. This creates more leverage than the aggregate trade numbers might suggest, but it also deepens the dilemma for the international community since sanctions would affect key sectors, including the military, and might then reverberate quickly throughout the economy. Substantial economic disruption could increase the risk of either a military response by North Korea or economic collapse, both of which North Korea's neighbors want to avoid.


 **Challenge for the Bush Administration: Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea.** Source: **Brookings Institution**, January 14, 2003.


"In this verbatim transcript of a discussion at the Brookings Institution, a panel of experts addresses a number of difficult questions and long-term repercussions of North Korea's belligerent stance, including the following: Why did North Korea revive its nuclear weapons program? Was it to pressure the United States into resuming desperately needed humanitarian shipments of food and fuel? Why has the United States taken two different approaches to thwarting the weapons programs of Iraq and North Korea? What military options—if any—does the United States have in North Korea? How can the Bush administration conduct a "dialogue" with North Korea and still maintain its announced policy of not making "concessions"? What role will China and Russia play in finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis?"

 **Options for Dealing with North Korea.** Source: **CATO**, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 73. Carpenter, Ted Galen. January 6, 2003.

"Various options have been presented for how the U.S. might deal with the threat of nuclear weapons in North Korea. According to the author, Washington should consider another approach. It should inform North Korea that, unless it abandons its nuclear program, the United States will encourage South Korea and Japan to make their own decisions about also going nuclear. That prospect might well cause the North to reconsider and keep the region nonnuclear. Even if it does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in northeast Asia might emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly."

Non-U.S. Government Links

 **Arms Control Association - North Korea: Documents, News and Analysis.** The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, *Arms Control Today*, ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association's staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.

 **Institute for Science and International Security - Country Assessment: North Korea.** ISIS is a non-profit, non-partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about science and policy issues affecting international security. Its efforts focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, bringing about greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, and achieving deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. ISIS's projects integrate technical, scientific, and policy research in

order to build a sound foundation for a wide variety of efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons to U.S. and international security.

Foreign Policy Association - North and South Korea: The Foreign Policy Association (FPA) is a national, nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental, educational organization founded in 1918 to educate Americans about the significant international issues that influence their lives. FPA provides impartial publications, programs and forums to increase public awareness of, and foster popular participation in, matters relating to those policy issues.

Is the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Still Attainable? Remarks by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Andrew K. Semmel to the United Nations Foundation, in Washington DC, June 1, 2006

U.S. Government Links

White House In Focus: National Security

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Country Background Notes: North Korea

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

USINFO: The U.S. and the Korean Peninsula

USINFO: International Security

U.S. Missile Defense Agency

CIA Fact book – North Korea

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